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Abstract
In this paper paper, I use Mej´ıa and Restrepo’s (2011) strategy to disentangle the causal re-
lationship between drug enforcement and violence. To test this relationship, I use information on
Colombian municipalities during the period 1999 − 2010. Due to technological reasons related to
the quality of terrain, climate, and locational characteristics of the Colombian territory, cocaine
production is more productive at low altitudes. Using the altitude of each municipality and distance
from capital cities as sources of exogenous variation, I estimate the effect of drug enforcement on
violence in Colombia. To control for a possible omitted-variable bias in the estimations, I run a
Panel Data Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). Additionally, I construct a set of indices with comparable
units of measure which allows me to determine which percentage of the Colombian violence data is
explained by drug enforcement. The results indicate that the Colombian government’s enforcement
activities increased in 0.98% the homicide rate and in 1.24% the displacement rate and the war
among drug dealers increased in 4.00% the homicide rate and 0.16% the displacement rate in the
period 1999− 2010.
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1 Introduction
Illegal markets for narcotics are usually correlated positively with violence1. This correlation has
elicited an intense debate because it is still unclear whether violence creates the incentives for the
illegal markets for narcotics to exist or viceversa, and who are the main perpetrators of such violence.
In this debate, the effects of the government’s enforcement activities on the violence generated in
these markets have generally been underestimated. I argue that drug enforcement has first– and
second–order effects on the violence generated in these markets, especially in source countries2.
In those countries, the government engages in prosecuting activities that sometimes involve military
expenditure to enforce prohibition. As prohibition applies to commodities supplied by decentralized
markets, drug dealers are able and willing to use their profits to fight back the government’s prosecuting
activities. This military power also allows them to solve their potential commercial disputes violently,
if needed. This is called the drug war in source countries. Thus, the first-order effect refers to the direct
violence that results from the government and drug dealers’ military expenditures on the drug war.
The second–order effect refers to the violence that emerges from the drug dealers’ military expenditure
on their drug war. This war occurs due to the absence of a legal system where drug dealers can solve
their commercial disputes pacifically and drug markets exhibiting contracting environments with high
transaction costs induced by enforcement.
To test the latter hypotheses, I use information on violence, drug and drug enforcement variables
from Colombia during the period 1999 − 2010. Since 1999, Colombia has formally embarked in a
program called “Plan Colombia”, aimed at reducing the amount of cocaine produced and distributed
in the country and overseas. This program involves, among others, the use of military tactics to
incentivize Colombians not to participate in the cocaine market. As a result, the Colombian central
government has declared all citizens who decide to produce narcotics and use force to fight back its
drug enforcement activities as military targets.
To test the effects of the government’s drug enforcement military activities, it would be ideal to use
a set of measures that permits to compare the levels of military expenditures of all participants in the
drug war per municipality. However, the Colombian vice–president’s office only collects information on
drug enforcement and drug war outcomes for every municipality of the country. With that multiplicity
of measurement units and, in certain cases, same–purpose variables, three problems arise.
First, some drug enforcement and drug war variables are almost perfectly spatially correlated.
This correlation generates a multicollinearity problem that results in estimations with erratic and
statistically insignificant estimates associated with those variables. Second, even if we are able to
orthogonalize those variables, their estimated coefficients might be affected by their measurement
units, which makes the estimates’ magnitude meaningless and unreliable. If we decide to use single
measures that proxy for the drug war military expenditures, it is a priori unclear which variables are
more appropriate to proxy for those expenditures. When we find a way to categorize and organize
them, it is again unclear how to interpret the measurement units of the resulting proxies due to the
measurement units diversity of the variables that compose them. Finally, some of the proxies for drug
war military expenditure are endogenous to the proxies for violence.
The simplest way to circumvent the first two problems is to construct a set of indices that proxy for
the government’s and drug dealers’ military expenditures. The methodology proposed in this paper
to compute these indices permits to categorize municipalities according to the government’s military
expenditure against drug dealers (Eradication Index), drug dealers’ military expenditure against the
government (Anti-Eradication Index) and drug dealers’ military expenditure against other drug deal-
1Violence is generally measured as the rate of homicides or displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants.
2A source country is defined as a country that has historically produced narcotics. For a list of illicit drugs and source
countries, see CIA (2013).
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ers (Drug Dealers’ War Index). The methodology employed allows me to compute these indices having
similar measurement units, which make their estimated coefficients objectively comparable. Addition-
ally, as these indices are computed such that they are all in the unit interval and the regressands are
expressed in logarithms, the indices’ estimated coefficients indicate the average percentage in which
the violence rate increases in the municipalities with the largest military expenditure relative to those
with zero military expenditure on drug war.
To overcome the last problem, I employ a joint strategy: On the one hand, I use Mej´ıa and Re-
strepo’s (2011) strategy to disentangle the real effects of drug production on enforcement variables.
Due to technological reasons associated with the quality of terrain, climate and locational character-
istics of the Colombian territory, cocaine production is more productive at low altitudes. Mej´ıa and
Restrepo’s (2011) strategy consists of running a 2SLS model using the altitude per municipality as an
exogenous source of variation in the first stage to determine how much violence is explained by the
Colombian drug war. I argue that given the Colombian government’s centralized structure in drug
enforcement decision making and policy application, two other sources of variation can be used: the
distance of a municipality to Bogota´, the country’s capital, and to the capital of departamento3 in
which it is located. A priori, there is no reason why drug enforcement variables are correlated with
municipalities’ altitude and distances to capitals other than by a technological issue associated with
cocaine production. To control for potential omitted variables that also help explain violence in the
Colombian municipalities, I run a panel data Spatial Durbin Model, which helps control for fixed,
temporal and geographical factors.
On the other hand, using the latter sources of variation and the idea that drug war military
expenditures are determined by the municipalities’ spatial and geographical characteristics for cocaine
production, I am able to reclassify municipalities according to their spatially-determined drug war
military expenditures. As this reclassification does not use violence variables to estimate the proxies
to recompute the indices, any correlation between the recomputed indices and violence variables can
be understood as a causal correlation.
My results suggest that the Colombian violence is explained by both the central government’s
drug enforcement activities and the actions taken by drug dealers to fight back that enforcement.
Furthermore, that violence is also explained by the efforts exerted by those groups to control the
territory, where they not only produce narcotics but also extract the rents from other natural resources
(such as gold and petroleum). Additionally, I find that the war among drug dealers has also an
important effect on the levels of violence in Colombia. Drug dealers use violent methods to resolve
their conflicts, affecting both the homicide rate and the displacement rate in the country.
This paper is organized as follows: section (1) is this introduction. Section (2) presents a short
overview of the theoretical relation among drugs, drug enforcement, and violence. Section (3) presents
the data used to test my hypotheses, with an emphasis on the spatial characteristics of the data used.
Section (4) explains the empirical strategy pursued to test my hypotheses. Section (5) presents the
results. Section (6) concludes the paper and section (6) contains the appendix.
3A departmento is similar to a U.S. state, but differs from an administrative viewpoint. A state has a constitution
apart from the national constitution, whereas a departmento follows the single set of rules determined by the national
constitution and legislature. After the constitution of 1991, Colombia initiated a decentralization process that involved
the appropriation by departmentos and municipalities of their property taxes. However, both the police and the army
are financed with national taxes and their prosecuting activities are decided entirely at the national level.
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2 Theoretical Background
2.1 A General Perspective
Illegal markets for narcotics are usually associated with violence. This correlation has triggered an
intense debate on who generates such violence and whether violence really leads to the production
of narcotics or viceversa. The empirical evidence on this correlation is mixed, and three competing
hypotheses have emerged as possible explanations for this regularity. A first hypothesis states that it
is violence that generates the production of narcotics. Using a unique data set on Western Casualties
in Afghan territory during the war against the Taliban regime after the 9/11, Lind et al. (2012) argue
that the rise in Afghan opium production since 2002 can be explained by the deterioration of the social
and economic infrastructure that emerged after the war. They argue that the conflict made “illegal
opportunities more profitable as they increase the perceived lawlessness and destroy infrastructure
crucial to alternative crops”(p. 1).
These authors use as an exogenous measure of conflict the number of western soldiers killed in
Afghan territory, who, they argue, had nothing to do with drug eradication activities. They claim
that the conflict against the Taliban generated a negative externality that led many Afghan farmers
to produce heroin. Dı´az and Sanchez (2004), using information from Colombian municipalities for
the period 1994 − 2000 and spatial econometric methods, show that the geographical intensification
of conflict in Colombia, measured as the number of attacks perpetrated by irregular groups such as
FARC, ELN and AUC 4, is the principal cause of the expansion of illegal crops of coca and poppy
plants in the country. The authors demonstrate the close geographical correlation between the illegal
groups’ presence and the production of cocaine in the municipalities in which they operate.
In both studies similar doubts linger. On the one hand, why are these “rebel” groups also located
in geographical areas with coca or poppy crops and the largest homicide rates? Aren’t these groups
directly involved in the production of narcotics to budget their war, for which they also fight back the
government’s eradication activities? On the other hand, why do individuals recur to the production
of drugs? And why is this production profitable when anything else is not?
In regards to the first doubt, Lind et al. (2012) cannot disregard the possibility that heroin pro-
duction might have been generated by the need of the Taliban for a quick revenue, which they called
drugs-for-arms hypothesis. The same applies to the Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary groups and
their involvement in the cocaine traffic5. If the drugs-for-arms hypothesis is true, this would imply
that the relationship between violence and the production of narcotics is biunivocal: when a group in
conflict needs a quick and secured source of revenue, they may recur to the production of narcotics to
obtain it, even if unintended in the first place, which in turn generates more violence. Such violence
might be associated with the military expenditure of those groups to accomplish their political goals
or defend their territory from the government’s eradication activities. Thus, the politically-motivated
violence is the only one that can be ascribed to the first hypothesis, as the other is triggered by the
existence of narcotics in that territory and the intention of the government to eradicate it militarily.
As the first hypothesis does not give a satisfactory answer to the latter questions, a second hy-
pothesis arises in the literature: the production, transportation, distribution, and retailing of drugs
generate violence. This hypothesis relies on the fact that illegalization leaves drug dealers without a
legal system to resolve their commercial and legal disputes. Caulkins et al. (2006) argue that drug deal-
ers use violence to resolve disputes and secure geographical positions in the retail market for narcotics.
4FARC (Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and ELN (Eje´rcito de Liberacio´n Nacional) are both leftist guerilla
groups, and AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) is a right-wing paramilitary group.
5see LeoGrande and Sharpe (2000) and Thoumi (2002) for a detailed analysis of the evolution of the illegal markets
for narcotics in Colombia and its effects on violence.
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They argue that those individuals who have a larger propensity to use violence secure themselves the
safest places on the retail market, which is where drug enforcement has the smallest probability to
affect them negatively. As for a source country, Angrist and Kugler (2008), using a similar data set as
Dı´az and Sanchez (2004), state that the productivity of soil and the geographical location of Colombia
create huge incentives for illegal groups to exploit these resources to produce illegal goods such as
cocaine. Hence, municipalities with a significant production of cocaine are more violent. This relation
is explained by the competition among rival groups, who compete for a share in the market, and with
the government, who plays a predatory game with these groups. In this literature, the production of
drugs is an endogenous variable that depends on the amount of enforcement and military capabilities
of irregular groups to fight back the prosecuting agencies and their rival competitors (See Mej´ıa and
Posada (2008) and Mej´ıa (2008) for papers that develop this idea).
In a recent paper, Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011) propose an identification strategy to disentangle the
causal relationship between the existence of illegal markets and violence. Based on several insights
about the technological features of the production of cocaine in Colombia provided by Mej´ıa and Rico
(2010)6, these authors use the altitude of a municipality to proxy for the productivity of the cultivation
of the coca plant. The underlying idea is that the plant produces more cocaine when harvested between
0 and 1700 meters above the sea level. As a result, if the existence of illegal markets has a real causal
effect on violence, a 2SLS strategy that uses the altitude of each municipality might help uncover such
a relationship. They show, using a panel of Colombian municipalities, that the existence of illegal
markets for cocaine has a positive effect on the level of violence in Colombia.
Two drawbacks can be pointed out from Mej´ıa and Restrepo’s (2011) paper. On the one hand,
altitude might also be correlated with drug enforcement activities of the Colombian government, and
not only with what drug dealers do to gain a market share in the Colombian cocaine market. Hence,
we must also control for enforcement activities of the Colombian government to be able to use the
production of cocaine as a proxy for the violence generated by drug dealers in the illegal markets for
cocaine. On the other hand, it is unclear why drug dealers have to resolve disputes violently when they
can agree not to. In other words, illegality is not a sufficient condition to secure a violent outcome.
Mirron (2001) argues that not all illegal activities generate violence or even an illegal market for them.
He argues that there must be something else that induces both the illegal markets and violence to
coexist. Using a panel of countries in which gun control data exist, he suggests that “differences in
the enforcement of drug prohibition are an important factor in explaining differences in violence rates
across countries”(p. 615).
Mirron (2001) relies on two factors that must be satisfied in order for illegal markets to exist and
generate violence. First, a banned activity must generate huge amounts of resources to its suppliers.
And second, enforcement activities are high, making transaction costs in the illegal markets sufficiently
high as to impede drug dealers use of coasean-type mechanisms to resolve their possible commercial
disputes. The Colombian case satisfies both conditions: some Colombian regions have a huge com-
parative advantage in producing goods that the rest of the world is highly interested in demanding at
relatively high prices even when illegal. This powerful financial incentive generates that illegal groups
try to create a public good —i.e., security for the production of drugs— in the most suitable regions.
Additionally, enforcement efforts by the Colombian government have been relatively high, especially
since “Plan Colombia” was enacted and put into action in 1999.
The last two hypotheses insinuate that the bulk of violence is explained by what drug dealers
do against each other. However, the drug war also implies that the enforcement agencies engage
in prosecuting activities and military actions against drug dealers, especially in source countries.
For instance, “Plan Colombia” is the archetypal case of enforcement activities by the government
6See Gootenberg (2008) for a thorough analysis of cocaine production in the Andean Countries.
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that involve the use of military tactics and methods to eradicate the production and manufacture of
narcotics (see Acevedo et al. (2008) and GAO (2008)). This program has received good evaluations
by its overall effects on the reduction of violence in Colombia, especially in the reduction of homicides
of people younger than 29 years old (see Baro´n (2009)). Nonetheless, is it possible to assure that the
government’s drug enforcement actions do not have an effect on violence?
I argue that they do. There are two type of effects that enforcement activities have on violence:
first–and second–order effects. A first–order effect is, for instance, the number of soldiers and police
officers as well as the number of drug dealers who die in the drug war. This is an effect of enforce-
ment because this violence occurs usually in the course of the eradication activities performed by the
government, in which they use military tactics to reach the areas where production is taking place.
As rebel groups obtain sufficient funds from the traffic of a highly demanded illegal commodity, when
the government performs eradication activities, its enforcement agencies are threatened by military
machinery that eventually reach them mortally too7. The second–order effect is the number of drug
dealers who get killed in their drug war. This is an effect of enforcement because illegality and high
enforcement efforts place wealthy drug dealers in an anarchic contractual environment where the death
and displacement of people seem to be the common results.
2.2 A Simple Model
To clarify ideas, let us suppose that we have the economy laid out in section (A.0.1). In that economy,
we could split municipality j’s rate of violence8 in the following way:
vj = β1M
g
j + β2M
r
j + β3M
ir
j + rest (1)
where β1M
g
j represents the proportion of violence that is attributed to the government’s drug
enforcement military expenditure in municipality j, Mgj . β2M
r
j represents the proportion of violence
that is explained by the drug dealers’ anti-enforcement military expenditure in municipality j, M rj .
β1M
g
j + β2M
r
j is called in section (2.1) the first–order effect of enforcement. Finally, β3M
ir
j represents
the proportion of violence explained by drug dealers’ military expenditure to control the territory to
produce drugs, M irj . This is called the second–order effect of enforcement.
If we had perfect and reliable information on Mgj , M
r
j and M
ir
j and each category in which vj can
be divided, including the categories of our interest, we could easily determine the values of β1, β2 and
β3 by solving simple linear equations for each municipality. However, such information is unavailable,
at least for Colombia. vj is only available at aggregated levels, and there is only information on drug
enforcement and drug war outcomes. In the next section, I explain the information available. In this
one, two consequences of such a lack of perfect information on drug war military expenditures and
violence variables are emphasized: on the one hand, β1, β2 and β3 will have to be estimated using
regression analysis. The latter implies that these betas will represent average values for the time
period considered.
On the other hand, we need to control for three factors to obtain reliable estimates of the betas:
first, we must control for vj ’s over-counting. Second, proxies for M
g
j , M
r
j and M
ir
j must be constructed
allowing for objectively comparable and reliable estimates. They also must represent the fact that
7If violence is measured as the rate of forcefully displaced people, the first–order effect is the number of civilians that
are displaced by both the eradication and anti-eradication activities performed by both groups involved in the drug war.
8The rate of homicides and displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants will be used below as proxies for the rate of violence.
In the next section, the composition of both rates are explained. Here, I will use violence as a generic term to refer to
those empirical estimates of violence.
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Colombian drug military expenditures have a geographical component that must be accounted for.
Finally, some of the available proxies for Mgj , M
r
j and M
ir
j are endogenous to the proxies for vio-
lence. Consequently, we must find an exogenous source of variation that determines those military
expenditures, which is at the same time uncorrelated with the used proxies for violence.
In the next section, I describe my strategy to circumvent the problems associated with the military
expenditures measurement. In section (4), I explain the empirical strategy to tackle the endogeneity
and over-counting problems. There, I also explain the strategy used to obtain the exogenous proxies
for military expenditures that take into account their spatial components.
3 The Data
3.1 Sources and Variables
To test the model laid out in equation (A.12), I use the homicide rate per 100, 000 inhabitants as a proxy
for violence. These rates are collected by the Colombian vice president’s office, and are a compilation
of violent homicides that occurred in each of the 1122 municipalities of the country during the period
1999-2010 9. Each of these rates contains the number of individuals who were assassinated violently.
It includes police officers, soldiers and prosecutors as well as any other individual who dies violently in
each municipality. In this regards, the Colombian vice president’s office does not keep separate records
of each of the categories that compose the total homicide rate of every municipality. Consequently, as
a measure of violence, it includes more homicides than can actually be ascribed to the drug war. In
the empirical strategy section, I explain how I handle this problem.
As a robustness check of my results, I also use the number of forcefully displaced people per munic-
ipality that the same source collects to compute the rate of displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants for
each municipality. The source defines an individual as forcefully displaced when the person is forced
to migrate within the national territory because her life, security, and/or freedom are at stake due to
the military actions of any of the groups involved in the conflict (i.e., guerrillas, AUC, drug dealers
or the government’s forces themselves). Because of the latter definition, I can also test whether the
geographically-located drug enforcement activities of the central government are generating displace-
ments or these are only the result of the existence of drugs as Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011) claim.
I use information on drug enforcement outcomes collected by the vice–president’s office to proxy for
the Colombian government’s drug enforcement military expenditure on every municipality. This data
set contains information on the amount of coca crops hectares that Colombia’s prosecuting agencies
eradicated either manually or by aspersion in the period 1999− 2010. It also includes the number of
performed operations in each intervened municipality to eradicate the number of declared hectares.
This data set also contains information on the number of destroyed labs dedicated to the production of
narcotics in the same period. Since 1999, the Colombian vice-president’s office also started to collect
information on the amount of attacks initiated by the government’s enforcement agencies, such as the
army or the police, against illegal groups. These groups include drug gangs and politically-motivated
groups, such as FARC, ELN or AUC, also known to be involved in the production of narcotics.
To my knowledge, the number of attacks initiated by the government has never been used to proxy
for drug enforcement activities of the central government in Colombia. Figure (1) shows that this
omission is not a minor one. The graph depicts the Colombian homicide rate and the logarithm of the
coca crops of the municipalities with high10 and low levels of government attacks. From the graph,
9For an analysis of the sources, its quality, and possible explanations about their discrepancies, see: Restrepo and
Aguirre (2007). For the official definition of the variables used in this paper, see: Vice-Presidencia de Colombia (2012)
(Spanish Version).
10To compute figure (1), a municipality was defined as a high-government-attacked municipality when it was included
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it is clear that municipalities with more military attacks by the government have substantially larger
homicide rates and coca production than municipalities with fewer of them.
Apart from the endogeneity problem associated with using the previous variable as a proxy for the
Colombian government’s drug enforcement military expenditure, running all these variables together
also results in a multicollinearity problem because some of them are almost perfectly correlated.
There are several ways to avoid this issue. One way is to perform a principal component analysis to
orthogonalize these variables. Another way is to perform a common factor analysis, which determines
the least number of factors that can account for the common variance of the set of enforcement variables
(See Comrey (1973) and Hair et al. (1992) for analysis on these methods). As both methods depend
on the variables’ measurement units, it is unclear the measurement units of the resulting proxy, which
affects the way I interpret the estimated results of drug enforcement variables on violence.
Another methodology to circumvent the multicollinearity problem is the one used by the Index of
Economic Freedom, which summarizes in a single measure 10 variables exhibiting a potential multi-
collinearity problem if used together11. Caudill et al. (2000) argue that when the variables to compute
an index are trying to proxy for a single dimensional variable, indexing and common factor analysis
give equivalent results when their estimated proxies are used in regression analysis. However, indexing
is simpler and indices can be computed such that they allow for objectively comparable estimates in
regression analysis, avoiding the issue of the measurement units presented in the other two method-
ologies. Besides, Index Theory 12 allows us to assure that an index has the following two properties:
first, it is able to capture the distribution of any compact set used to create the index, converting
the moments’ units of the domain set into the index units. Second, the correspondence that maps
the domain set into the index numbers affects the accuracy of the index to capture the domain set
distribution.
Bearing that in mind, I construct the following Eradication Index:
IE =
∑6
i IE,i
18
(2)
where13,
IE,i =

3 if V ari > percentile(ai, 70)
2 if percentile(ai, 30) < V ari < percentile(ai, 70)
1 if min(ai) < V ari < percentile(ai, 30)
0 if V ari = 0
(3)
where ai is a non-zero vector composed of the elements of V ari, and V ari is any of the 6 afore-
mentioned variables used to compute this index.
in the upper tail of the distribution of the number of attacks initiated by the government against irregular groups (defined
by the 70th percentile of the distribution or above).
11Beach and Kane (2008) presents an analysis of the Index of Economic Freedom
12 See Ha´jek (2009) for a mathematical analysis of the properties of indices.
13The choice of the percentile values to construct these indices are based on the distributions of its composing variables.
However, my results are not sensitive to small changes in the threshold values for each category.
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Figure 1: Homicide Rate and Coca Crops divided by Intensity of Government’s Attacks
Several features are worth noting about the latter index. First, the index-composing variables are
split between those municipalities with zero and strictly positive drug enforcement outcomes. This
implies that my initial comparison will be between these two categories. Second, the highest possible
score for a municipality is 1814. Thus, IE  [0, 1]. Third, if I run the model laid out in equation (A.12),
using IE to proxy for the government’s drug enforcement military expenditure and the regressands
in logarithms, β1IE would measure the percentage in which a municipality’s violence rate changes
with an enforcement level of IE relative to a municipality with zero enforcement. To clarify the latter
idea, let us assume that we have a municipality’ violence rate v expressed in logarithms. This v
assumes different values depending on which level of drug war intensity a municipality has. If the
latter possibility is true, let vIE=1 and vIE=0 represent a municipality’s violence rate with a drug
enforcement index of 1 and 0, respectively. Ceteris paribus, β1 can be expressed as follows:
14There are six variables. If a municipality scores 3 in all 6 enforcement variables (i.e., it is located in the 70th percentile
or above in the distributions of all the index composing variables), it will score 18=6x3.
9
β1 = vIE=1 − vIE=0 = β1(IE = 1− IE = 0) (4)
As the v’s are expressed in logarithms, β1 represents the percentage in which the violence rate
changes by going from IE = 0 to IE = 1. As a result, if β1 is positive, it means that drug enforcement
increases in β1% the Colombian municipalities’ violence rate. If β1 is negative, it means that drug
enforcement decreases that rate in the same percentage. Fourth, IE possesses 18 possible values,
permitting to measure exhaustively the different eradication levels produced by the government across
the country. If we wanted to determine the change in the violence rate’s growth rate explained by
moving IE from one eradication level I
i
E to a higher one I
j
E , we would simply perform the algebraic
operation β1(I
j
E − IiE).
The vice–president’s office also collects information on the number of attacks perpetrated by ir-
regular groups against official buildings, such as police stations or military bases, and official forces,
such as the police or army. This variable has traditionally been used to proxy for the geographically-
located military activities of irregular groups in Colombia. In fact, this is the main variable that Dı´az
and Sanchez (2004) use to test whether violence increases cocaine production. According to paper
written by Dı´az and Sanchez (2004), this variable might be endogenous to the existing proxies for
violence. Apart from this endogeneity problem, I could also construct an index for this variable to
obtain comparable estimates with those of the previous index. As a result, I construct the following
Anti–Eradication Index:
IAE =

3
3 = 1 if irreattacks > percentile(a, 70)
2
3 if percentile(a, 30) < irreattacks < percentile(a, 70)
1
3 if min(a) < irreattacks < percentile(a, 30)
0
3 = 0 if irreattacks = 0
(5)
where a is again a non-zero vector composed of the elements of irreattacks, and irreattacks is
the number of attacks perpetrated by irregular groups against the government’s security forces. This
index satisfies similar features to the ones mentioned for the previous index. In this case, β2 represents
the highest possible percentage change in the violence rate that is explained by the irregular groups’
highest level of military expenditure against drug enforcement (IAE=1). As in the previous case, if
I wanted to determine the change in the violence rate’ growth rate explained by moving IAE from
one eradication level IiAE to a higher one I
j
AE , I would again simply perform the algebraic operation
β2(I
j
AE − IiAE).
In turn, Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011) use the coca cultivation figures from SIMCI15 to proxy for the
drug dealers’ war. The vice–president’s office also collects information on two other variables that I
argue also capture that war: the number of massacres committed by irregular groups in their regions
or areas of influence, and the number of incidents and accidents with mine fields. These two variables
are also available from 1999 to 2010, and they are computed taking into account how closely they are
related to the conflict among irregular groups in Colombia. In that sense, massacres are defined to be
perpetrated by irregular groups in their conflict on their areas of influence16, and mine fields appear
to be used by irregular groups to protect their coca, marihuana and poppy fields17.
Running these variables together also results in a multicollinearity problem as in the eradication
15Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Il´ıcitos– A United States Office for Drugs and Crime in Colombia. See
its web-site: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (2012).
16See Human Right Watch (2010) for a thorough analysis of the possible causes, main perpetrators, and main modus
operandi in which massacres are committed in Colombia.
17see Human Right Watch (2007) for a thorough analysis of guerrilla use of landmines in Colombia, and its consequences
on the civil population.
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index case. Following the same logic laid out for that index, I construct the following Drug Dealers
War Index:
IDW =
∑3
i IDW,i
9
(6)
where,
IDW,i =

3 if V ari > percentile(ai, 70)
2 if percentile(ai, 30) < V ari < percentile(ai, 70)
1 if min(ai) < V ari < percentile(ai, 30)
0 if V ari = 0
(7)
where ai is again a non-zero vector composed of the elements of V ari, and V ari is any of the 3
variables mentioned above used to compute this index. In this case, β3 would represent the highest
percentage change in the violence rate that is explained by the drug dealers’ highest level of military
expenditure on drug war (IDW=1). As in the previous cases, if I wanted to determine the change in
the violence rate’s growth rate explained by moving IDW from one eradication level I
i
DW to a higher
one IjDW , I would again simply perform the algebraic operation β3(I
j
DW − IiDW ).
Finally, it should be pointed out that all those variables might be correlated because they occur in
municipalities where there is an insufficient central government presence, its rule of law is very scarce
and there are huge economic opportunities to produce narcotics without the pressure of enforcement.
I include as controls for the central government’s presence the square kilometers per capita of a munic-
ipality18 19, the logarithm of its population, its distance20 to Bogota´ and to its capital of departmento.
These two last variables do not vary across years, which makes them not the best control variables
for a panel. Additionally, it is untrue that distance captures correctly the institutional strength of a
region. Given the centralized structure of Colombian military expenditure21, there are regions with
larger economic power that attract more resources on security from the central government. Thus, I
computed the following two variables:
dbogotai = 1− ( 1
1 + dbogotamuni
) ∗ DepGDP
BogotaGDP
(8)
dcapitalsi = 1− ( 1
1 + dcapitalsmuni
) ∗ DepGDP
BogotaGDP
(9)
where dbogotamuni and dcapitalsmuni are the distances of municipality i to Bogota´ and the
18The idea behind this instrument is that a larger area per capita indicates a smaller police presence, which reduces the
efficiency of the government’s enforcement activities. As a result, a larger area per capita signifies a worse institutional
presence, which implies a better location for producing illegal narcotics with a smaller probability of capture.
19An alternative measure would be the local government’s public expenditure. However, that information is not
available at the municipality level, avoiding me to use it as an instrument.
20The distances expressed in miles or kilometers are not available for every municipality. Moreover, for some munici-
palities their distances changed because roads were built or improved during our period of analysis as a policy response
to cocaine production. As a result, I use the coordinate system of every municipality expressed in degrees to construct a
measure of distance for each of them. As such, this system does not take into account the possible natural barriers that
make a municipality inaccessible. However, it still can capture the relative distance of a municipality to the main capitals,
where most of the military bases are, and from which military attacks are planed and executed, which is precisely what
I want to control for.
21See Avella (2009) for an analysis on the historical Colombian public expenditure levels and institutional organization.
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capital of departmento in which municipality i is located, respectively. BogotaGDP is the Bogota´’s
2010 real GDP and DepGDP is the 2010 real GDP of the departmento in which municipality i is
located both measured by DANE22.
The values of dbogotai and dcapitalsi are between 0 and 1. The closer a municipality is to Bogota´
and its capital city of departamento, the closer dbogotai and dcapitalsi are to 0. To define proximity,
these measures take into account the economic importance of the departamento in which municipality
i is located relative to that of Bogota´. For instance, when I look at figures (A.1) and (A.2)23 in the
appendix, I realize that a municipality in the southern departamento of Amazonas is as far away from
Bogota´ than a municipality located in the northern departamento of La Guajira. However, La Guajira
is economically richer than Amazonas. My measures are able to differentiate the relative importance
of those two municipalities through the relative weight that La Guajira’s and Amazonas’ GDPs have
on that of Bogota´24.
It is clear that the distance measures computed in equations (8) and (9) are not the best proxies
to capture the institutional strength of a municipality relative to Bogota´ or its capital of depart-
mento, which is assumed to determine its assignment of security forces to eradicate coca leaves by the
Colombian central government . The reason is that accessibility might also be an important factor to
determine whether a municipality is good for the production of coca leaves, and to determine whether
the Colombian central government dedicates resources to eradicate coca crops in that municipality.
Unfortunately, there is not a good measure of accessability for every municipality of the country, and
a radial distance seems not to be a bad instrument to capture institutional presence within a depar-
tamento and the country. At least, that seems to be true for coca crops production in Colombia and
the prosecuting activities that the government has followed to eradicate this production.
Coca production in Colombia has historically taken place in municipalities with large rural op-
portunities for the crop. These municipalities are usually located far away from the capital cities
where the rural property size is larger and income lower relative to those of the main capital cities.
The latter can be seen when we compare the average of the rural property size in figure (A.2a) and
the GDP by departamento in figure (A.2b) with the drug dealers war index25 in figure (A.4c) in the
appendix, where we realize that coca production is mainly taking place far away from the main cap-
ital cities of the country where the average of the rural property size is larger and in departamentos
with a smaller GDP relative to that of Bogota´’s. Additionally, the pattern of the average of the rural
property size indicates that the average of the rural property size in a municipality increases in a sort
of radial way the farther the municipality is from the main capital city of the departamento in which
the municipality is located as well as the farther it is from Bogota´. As a result, if a municipality’s
22DANE(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estad´ısticas) is the official center that collects colombian socio-
economic information.
23The maps presented in figure (A.2) were taking from SIGOT (Sistema de Informacio´n Geogra´fica para la Planeacio´n
y el Ordenamiento Territorial) website, which is the official site where the Colombian central government publishes the
country’s spatial and geographical information. The GDP information at the municipality level is not available for all
the municipalities of the country for the period of analysis, and the average of the rural property size per municipality
is only available for 1101 municipalities (out of 1122) for 2007 and 2009. Due to this lack of information, I was not able
to include these two variables as instruments to control for the potential of a municipality to produce coca crops.
24In the regression results presented below, the distance variables were used as indicated in this section. However,
several alternatives were pursued. One alternative is to compute them only using the GDP ratios. As there is only GDP
information by departamento, one solution is to assume that all the municipalities of a single departamento had the same
GDP. This alternative provided statistically insignificant estimates for the unique distance variable computed because all
the variability gained using the distance variables proposed in the text is lost within a single departamento. As a result,
it losses explanatory power because it is useless to explain the huge differences that exist within a single departamento
in terms of cocaine production and violence.
25This index is mainly determined by the production of coca leaves and the number of accidents and incidents with
mine fields.
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rural property size average and income are good predictors for its potential to have coca production,
the distance variables computed in equations (8) and (9) also seem a good alternative to capture that
potential because they capture the radial development that take place in most of the departamentos
of the country, which also increase the potential for the production of coca crops. In fact, when I run
a simple OLS regression of the logarithm of coca crops size against the distance variables computed
in equations (8) and (9), the following results are obtained26:
log(crops) = −5.15∗∗∗ + 2.49∗∗dbogota+ 5.64∗∗∗dcapitals (10)
If equation (10) adequately captures the relationship between the logarithm of coca crops and
the distance variables27, it indicates the percentage in which the coca crops production increases
in municipalities that are far way from Bogota´ and their capital of departamento. Thus, the most
distant municipalities from Bogota´ have a 2.49% more coca crops production and the most distant
municipalities from their capital of departamento have a 5.64% more coca crops production. In this
sense, coca production seems to be taken place in distant municipalities from the main capital cities.
Consequently, if the government also follows a similar logic with respect to the eradication of narcotics
as the one followed by coca producers, I argue that the distance variables might also help determine
the assignment of security forces by the Colombian central government to eradicate and control the
production of narcotics on a municipality because the military machinery and tactics used by the
government can be applied to most of the country, without having accessability a determining influence
on the decision whether to eradicate or not on a municipality difficult to access.
Table (A.1) in the appendix presents a summary table for the variables used in this study. Two
points are worth noting about table (A.1). On the one hand, the values presented on the table are
averages of the variables for the period 1999 − 2010. When I observe the 5 summary numbers for
the three indices, which summarizes their distributions, two characteristics are observed: first, the
distributions of the eradication (IE) and drug-dealers-war (IDW ) indices are both positively skewed.
This implies that most of the Colombian municipalities are categorized as being of low-enforcement and
low-drug-dealers-war levels. I also can observe that the maximum values in the average distributions
of IE and IDW are 0.81 and 0.71, which implies that there was not a single municipality that received
central government’s drug–enforcement and drug-dealers-war activities in every year of the data set.
Consequently, there were municipalities in which those drug outcomes were more common, while for
most of the municipalities, those drug activities took place rather intermittently during the period of
my data set. Second, the distribution of IAE is, in contrast, negatively skewed, with a median value of
zero. Besides, the maximum value in the IAE average distribution is 1. Consequently, anti-eradication
activities were concentrated in a reduced amount of municipalities, while for most of the municipalities,
those drug activities never took place.
On the other hand, I do not include variables that control for income or labor market variables
because the information on these variables is deficient or nonexistent. Sometimes, the proxies used
in some studies are endogenous to the homicide rate or of poorer quality than normal. To overcome
such a deficiency in information, I will run a panel data Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) with fixed and
temporal effects. This model helps control for omitted variables not included in the regressions, which
can be useful to explain the violence in Colombian municipalities. In the next subsection, I argue that
26(***) indicates that the estimated parameter is statistically significant at 1% and (**) indicates that the estimated
parameter is statistically significant at 5%.
27It is obvious that the estimated parameters of equation (10) are not perfectly estimated because there is an omitted
variable bias in their estimation. A similar regression analysis is performed in table (A.5) controlling for this omitted
variable bias. The result obtained in that table (not shown in the table) is similar to the one obtained in equation (10).
Thus, the results of equation (10) are indicative of the positive correlation between coca production and distance from
capital cities in Colombia.
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spatial methods are necessary to run these regressions and in section (4), I present my identification
strategy to test my hypotheses.
3.2 A spatial correlation
An extensive literature documents the spatial correlation of the homicide rate and the existence of
drugs in Colombia (Mej´ıa and Rico (2010); Dı´az and Sanchez (2004); Holmes et al. (2006); & Gooten-
berg (2008)). Figures (A.3) and (A.4) in the appendix show averages for the main variables used in
this paper. On the top of each graph, I present the average of the logarithm of the homicide and
displacement rates per municipality for the period 1999 − 2010. A first characteristic I can observe
on these maps is that not all municipalities present homicides or forcefully displaced people during
this period. On all maps, the blue color represents a value of zero for the variable under examination.
The small cluster of southern municipalities close to the Amazon region28 and another on the west
coast are the only ones with zero homicides during the period. The same happens with the rate of
displaced people, which exhibits a smaller cluster of southern municipalities with zero values. These
regularities might occur because those municipalities are mostly uninhabited. Most of the terrain of
those municipalities comprises natural reserves and, in some cases, is difficult to access.
Second, in general I observe that the country presents both high homicide and displaced people
rates in almost its entire territory. However, there are municipalities in which the situation is worse.
In figures (A.3a) and (A.3b), the red color indicates a spatial concentration of the violence variables
in specific regions of the country. The most problematic ones are close to Venezuela, Panama´, and
Buenaventura Port, located on the Pacific coast, which are all exit points used by irregular groups to
smuggle cocaine overseas29.
Third, figures (A.3c), (A.3d), (A.4c), and (A.4d) present the drug war indices as defined in the
previous sub-section. On the maps, I observe that the indices are also spatially concentrated with a
larger proportion of Colombian municipalities exhibiting a value of zero in all three indices. In this
case, a key point can be noted: both the Eradication Index (figure (A.3c)) and the Drug Dealers War
Index (figure (A.4c)) are more spatially concentrated around the areas in which most of the homicides
and displacements take place; whereas the Anti-Eradication Index is less scarcely concentrated around
the same areas. However, all three indices are spatially correlated with both endogenous variables to a
certain degree30. This fact is confirmed when I analyze table (A.2) in the appendix, where I rank the
main variables of this study by departamento. In this table, I observe that there are departamentos
with high values in both endogenous variables and all three indices; for example, Guaviare, Caqueta,
Arauca and Putumayo, among others.
It is worth noticing that the indices’ maps confirm the intuition about the indices average dis-
tributions laid out in section (3.1). On the one hand, it is clear on the maps that anti-eradication
activities are taking place on clusters of municipalities. Those clusters are located in the South –Meta,
Guaviare, Caqueta´ and Putumayo departmentos–, Northeast –Arauca, Norte de Santander and Cesar
departmentos–, Northwest –Bolivar, Sucre, Co´rdoba and Antioquia departmentos–, and Southwest
–South of Choco, Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Narin˜o departmentos. Additionally, when I compare
28See figure (A.1) for a detailed map of Colombia and its main international frontiers.
29See the Moran I’s tests below.
30 If we compute Moran I’s tests to tests whether these variables are spatially correlated, the following results are
obtained: 0.14, 0.12 and 0.13 for the correlation between the logarithm of homicide rate and the eradication, anti-
eradication and drug dealers war indices respectively, and 0.26, 0.17 and 0.28 for the correlation between the logarithm
of the displacement rate and the eradication, anti-eradication and drug dealers war indices, respectively, being all these
tests statistically significant at 1%. In order to compute these indices, I use the 5-nearest neighbors contingent matrix.
The numbers obtained for the Moran I’s tests indicate that there is a spatial correlation between the dependent variables
and the drug war indices.
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those clusters with the altitude per municipality shown in figure (A.4d), it seems as if Colombian
anti-eradication activities were geographically located at the bottom of the main mountain chains
that crosses Colombia31. On the other hand, Eradication and Drug Dealers War Indices are scattered
around over almost the entire country, both exhibiting many small municipalities on the top of the
mountain chains with zero values. It is also clear on the maps that these last two indices are also
geographically distributed relative to the Colombian mountain chains. It seems that the altitude and
distance to Bogota´ are good exogenous sources of variation to explain all three indices’ variability. In
the next section, I explain how to exploit them to obtain exogenous proxies for the drug war indices.
Finally, I observe that all those variables exhibit a high spatial autocorrelation. In table (A.1)
in the appendix, I compute Moran I’s test32 for each of the variables used in this study. This test
indicates that when determining the causal correlation among those variables, I must also include
controls for the spatial autocorrelation that they exhibit. In the following section, I also explain how
I perform that task.
4 The Empirical Strategy
My main interest is to test whether drug enforcement has an effect on violence in Colombia. To attain
that, my empirical strategy consists of three stages: first, I run the following model under the same
idea proposed in equation (A.12):
v = β0 + ρWv +Xβ +WXθ +  (11)
where v represents a (N*T)x1 vector containing any of the two endogenous variables used in this
study: the logarithm of the homicide or the (forcefully) displaced people rates, both per 100, 000
inhabitants. N = 1122 is the number of Colombian municipalities and T = 12 is the number of years
used for estimation. X is a (N*T)x7 matrix containing the following variables: IE , the Eradication
Index proposed in equation (2); IAE , the Anti-Eradication Index proposed in equation (5); and IDW ,
the Drug Dealers War Index proposed in equation (6). X also contains some institutional controls
such as the logarithm of the population, municipality area per capita, and the “distance” of each
municipality to Bogota´ and its capital of departamento as defined by equations (8) and (9) respectively.
Following Anselin (1988) and LeSage and Pace (2009), I include in the estimations Wy and WX to
proxy for omitted variables that might help explain the variability of the endogenous variables but for
which there is not information available. W is a spatial weight matrix constructed using the 5 nearest
neighbors of each municipality33.
As all the variables in X vary across time, equation (11) can be estimated including fixed or time
effects, where the parameters associated to the indices 34 are the main parameters of interest. However,
31 One chain goes from Narin˜o (South) to Santander and Norte de Santander (Northeast), and the other from Narin˜o
to Antioquia (Northwest).
32I also use the 5-nearest neighbor contingent matrix to compute these tests.
33A common problem in spatial econometrics is the choice of the aggregation level used to construct the weight matrices.
I tried three different combinations of weight matrices: 5, 10, and 15 nearest neighbors. My results show that when I
increase the number of neighbors considered, the estimated first- and second-order effects of section 2.2 above become
slightly stronger for all three indices. These results might be explained by the fact that the municipalities with the worse
drug war and violence outcomes tend to be in departamentos with large extensions of territory and few municipalities,
such as Guaviare (4), Putumayo (13), Vichada (4), Arauca (7), and Guain´ıa (9). All these municipalities are more likely
to be close neighbors in econometric terms, when the number of neighbors considered to construct the weight matrix
increases. Consequently, throughout the presentation of the econometric model and the results, I always refer to or use
the 5-neighbor contingent matrix. This matrix allows me to capture the neighbors’ influence on a municipality, without
taking into account neighbors from distant departamentos for those special cases.
34The parameters β1, β2 and β3 of 1.
15
in this specification some of the variables used to compute all three indices are endogenous. Specifically,
the number of military attacks initiated by the central government against irregular groups, which
is one of the main variables used to compute IE , is endogenous to the violence rates. These attacks
are performed by the army and police, who consider the level of violence as well as the required level
of coca eradication in each municipality, to perform their enforcement activities in a municipality.
This is in contrast to the other 5 variables used to compute IE , which are performed by Polic´ıa
Antinarco´ticos35. Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011) argue that coca crops, which is one of the variables used
to compute IDW , are also endogenous to the level of violence. I argue that massacres and incidents
and accidents with mine fields, the other two variables used to compute IDW , are also endogenous to
the levels of violence in Colombia. Following Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011), I must find an exogenous
source of variation that helps explain those variables but at the same time is uncorrelated with either
the homicide or displacement rates.
These authors use the altitude per municipality to proxy for the existence of illegal markets for
cocaine in Colombia. They point out that, for technological reasons related to soil and climate condi-
tions, coca plants provide larger concentrations of cocaine at lower altitudes. As a result, municipalities
located at lower altitudes have more coca crops and more violence associated to the illegal markets for
cocaine that results from these crops. Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011) argue that there is no reason why
the altitude might be correlated with violence other than through its effect on cocaine production.
According to the model laid out in section (A.0.1), this conclusion is imprecise because cocaine pro-
duction is also endogenous to the eradication and anti-eradication military expenditures performed by
the central government and drug dealers in each municipality.
I argue that a municipality’s distance to its capital of departamento and Bogota´, the measures
computed in equations (8) and (9), also help explain the productivity of coca production in Colombia
for two reasons. First, it is more difficult and expensive to produce coca crops in capital cities or near
them due to a stronger police presence. In these municipalities, the most important economic and
public administrative activities of each departamento take place. This leads the central government to
allocate relatively more resources on police to these capital cities. Second, the Colombian central gov-
ernment organizes and executes its military operations using strategically–positioned military bases.
These military bases are located near or within the capital cities of the most important departamen-
tos36. These two features suggest that the distance of a municipality to its capital of departamento
is a good source of exogenous variation to capture the opportunity costs of cocaine production in
Colombia. The spatial analysis laid out in section (3.2) indicates that the distance to Bogota´ is also
a good source of variation.
Those exogenous sources of variation are used to determine the potential intensity of attacks tar-
geted to a municipality by drug dealers and the government to perform anti-eradication and eradication
activities as follows:
y = β0 + ρWy +Xβ +WXθ +  (12)
where y is a (N*T)x1 vector that contains either of the following two endogenous variables: the
number of attacks initiated by the government against irregular groups or the number of attacks
35Antinarcotics police. This is a police unit that follows a source of information different to the amount of homicides
or displaced people to plan and perform their tasks. They use the number of crops captured by SIMCI, which are values
that are available when coca crops are almost ready for harvesting, which occurs at least six months after the coca trees
are planted (See SIMCI web-site for technical issues regarding possible delays in coca crops satellite data collection). In
that sense, Antinarcotics police plan their enforcement activities based on a database that might be lagged at least six
months.
36See Dube and Naidu (2012) for an analysis of the Colombian military operations, the location of its military bases,
and the possible consequences of these military operations on violence.
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initiated by irregular groups against the central government’s security forces. X is a (N*T)x3 matrix
containing my exogenous sources of variation. As the altitude per municipality does not vary over
time, I cannot include fixed or time effects to estimate equation (12), because they are perfectly
correlated with my instrument. To control for omitted variables that might help explain any of these
two variables, I also include Wy and WX.
I use yˆ = βˆ0+Xβˆ as a proxy for drug enforcement and anti-enforcement activities of the government
and irregular groups. These variables measure the potential intensity of attacks a municipality might
have due to its potential for coca production, given by its own geographical and spatial position. Notice
that I do not include any of the spatial effects to compute the proxies. Thus, every yˆi is computed
only using the information contained in X for municipality i and the β’s are computed net of possible
omitted variables that also help explain why a municipality receive military attacks by any of the
groups considered.
In turn, I use the proxies obtained in the previous step to estimate the following model:
y = β0 + ρWy +Xβ +WXθ +  (13)
where in this case y is a (N*T)x1 vector containing either the logarithm of hectares of coca crops
captured by SIMCI, the number of massacres committed by irregular groups in their areas of influence
or the number of incidents and accidents with mine fields, which are known to be used to protect the
coca crops from being eradicated. X in this case contains the exogenous sources of variation used in
equation (12), along with the proxies for drug enforcement and anti-enforcement activities computed
from the same equation. Again, I include Wy and WX to proxy for omitted variables that might help
explain any of the last three variables used to compute IDW .
Using equation (13), I use yˆ = βˆ0 + Xˆβˆ as instruments to proxy for the variables used to compute
IDW . Xˆ does not contain any of the proxies for drug enforcement and anti-enforcement activities
computed from equation (12). As a result, the computation of IDW is net of those enforcement activ-
ities. Also, Xˆβˆ is a measure that resembles the drug dealers war’ instrumentalized proxy computed
by Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011). Thus, my results are directly comparable with those found by them.
Then, the final stage involves recomputing all indices as explained in equations (2), (5), and (6),
using the proxies found in equations (12) and (13), with a slight difference that the vector a in those
equations is now composed of the entire array of values of the computed proxies without a priori division
of every array between zero and positive values. With these recomputed indices, I run again the model
laid out in equation (11), concluding my empirical strategy. Before analyzing the results, two points
are worth noting: first, the measurement units of the recomputed indices are entirely comparable with
those of the original indices; as a result, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients associated to
these new indices is the same. Second, my methodology to recompute the indices do not bias the
estimated results in any systematic way. The recomputed indices reorganize municipalities according
to their estimated potential to have drug war military expenditures, resulting from their geographical
and spatial location, which is a priori unrelated to violence. As a consequence, any correlation between
these indices and the proxies for violence can be understood as a causal correlation.
5 Results
5.1 Initial Results
The lack of information associated to income or labor market variables for the Colombian municipalities
forces me to rely on indirect methods to control for a potential omitted-variable bias in our estimations.
This section is based on Elhorst (2003) and Elhorst (2012), who formally present the rationale behind
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running a Panel Data Spatial Durbin Model to control for this econometric problem. They also present
the empirical application where they indicate the different existing alternatives to test whether the
spatial and panel data effects controlled for with this model are really of statistical significance.
A good feature of spatial econometrics methods is that they also allow to use a municipality’s
neighbors information to estimate the effects of the municipality’s drug war indices on its own violence
outcomes. This interrelation also allows to determine the effect of a municipality’s drug war indices
on its neighbors’ violence outcomes. These effects are called the direct and indirect effects of the
drug war indices on violence, respectively. It is worth noticing that these two effects are conceptually
and quantitatively different from the drug enforcement’s first– and second-order effects defined in the
introduction. The first–order effect of drug enforcement includes the direct and indirect effects of IE
and IAE on violence. The second–order effect includes the direct and indirect effects of IDW .
The estimation results of equation (11) are presented in tables (A.3) and (A.4) in the appendix.
Table (A.3) presents the estimation results for the logarithm of the homicide rate; table (A.4) does it
for the logarithm of the displacement rate. In the first column of each table, I present the estimated
coefficients provided by MATLAB without including fixed or time effects. LeSage and Pace (2009)
argue that these estimated coefficients are not the main interest of the spatial econometric analysis, but
the direct, indirect and total effects computed from them. Even though I analyze the estimated spatial
effects, which were computed as explained by Elhorst (2003), I follow Elhorst (2012) in presenting these
estimated regression coefficients for the sake of results completeness.
On columns 2 to 4 of each table, I present the estimated direct, indirect, and total effects of
equation (11). In turn, from column 5 to 12 of each table, I present the same types of results as in the
first four columns including fixed, time, and fixed and time effects, respectively. I also present in each
table the tests to ascertain whether a Panel Data Spatial Durbin Model is the correct specification to
estimate equation (11), as explained by Elhorst (2012). According to Elhorst (2012), there are two
alternatives to test whether the correct model to run is a panel data Spatial Durbin Model(SDM),
Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) or a Spatial Error Model (SEM). There is a common argument
underlying both alternatives: the SDM model can be reduced to either the SAR model or the SEM
model. The main difference between the two alternatives is that one compares the performance of
the particular model (SAR or SEM) with the general model (SDM), and the other compares the
performance of the general model (SDM) with the particular model (SAR or SEM).
The alternative that goes from the particular model to the general model uses simple LM tests
to determine which model better explains the variability of the data. There are two types of tests to
use with this alternative: One type compares the SAR (or SEM) model with the SDM model without
controlling for the possibility that the data also follows a SEM (or SAR) model jointly with the SAR
(or SEM) model. These tests are labeled LM spatial lag in tables (A.3) and (A.4) in the appendix for
the comparison between the SAR model with the SDM model and LM spatial error for the comparison
between the SEM model and the SDM model. The other type of tests to use with this alternative
compares the SAR (or SEM) model with the SDM model controlling for the possibility that the data
also follows a SEM (or SAR) model jointly with the SAR (or SEM) model. These tests are labeled
Rob. LM spatial lag in tables (A.3) and (A.4) in the appendix for the comparison between the SAR
model with the SDM model and Rob. LM spatial error for the comparison between the SEM model
and the SDM model.
In turn, the alternative that goes the general model to the particular model uses either Wald or
LR tests to determine which model better explains the variability of the data. In this case, these
tests are labeled Wald spatial lag or LR spatial lag in tables (A.3) and (A.4) in the appendix for the
comparison between the SDM model with the SAR model and Wald spatial error or LR spatial error
for the comparison between the SDM model with the SEM model. In both testing alternatives, the
null hypothesis is that the data does not follow the SDM model (either the SAR or SEM models)
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against the alternative hypothesis that it does follow the SDM model. As a result, a large value in
any of the latter tests indicate that the SDM model better explains the variability of the data.
Several results can be derived from table (A.3). First, following Elhorst (2012), all tests indicate
that the best specification to run equation (11) is a Panel Data Spatial Durbin Model. In other words,
there are omitted variables that help explain violence in Colombia, which are properly captured by
Wy and WX in equation (11). All the estimated values of ρ in table (A.3) indicate that there is a
positive correlation between municipality i’s homicide rate and the homicide rate of municipality i’s
surrounding municipalities. As a result, there are geographical factors not controlled for with the fixed
or time effects that also help explain the homicide rate in Colombia in the period 1999−2010. Second,
regardless of whether I include fixed, time, or both effects together, there is a positive correlation
between the Eradication Index (IE) and both the logarithm of the homicide and displaced people rates
in Colombia. The estimated impact of the Colombian government’s military eradication activities is
very stable across specifications. In section (3.1), the interpretation of the estimated results associated
to these indices is explained. There, it is said that β1
37 represents the percentage change of the violence
rate resulting from drug enforcement. As I consider spatial effects, β1 is estimated by the total spatial
effects, composed of the sum of the direct and indirect effects of IE on v.
Second, tables (A.3) and (A.4) indicate that the government’s drug enforcement activities generated
a total increase in the homicide rate between 1.14% and 2.47% and a total increase in the displacement
rate between 1.02% and 2.84%. According to these results, the total effects appear to be mainly driven
by the direct effects of enforcement. In other words, it appears that coca eradication activities generate
violence in the municipalities in which they are performed. However, I cannot give these results a causal
interpretation because IE is endogenous to both the levels of violence and the production of narcotics.
Third, the attacks of irregular groups against the government’s security forces do generate homi-
cides and displaced people in Colombia. According to table (A.3), the estimated impact of the irregular
groups’ activities on violence is also very stable across specifications. These activities generate an esti-
mated total increase in the homicide rate between 0.53% and 1.33% and an estimated total increase in
the displaced people rate between 0.76% and 1.84%. According to these results, when irregular groups
attack a municipality, their actions also affect contiguous municipalities. These attacks are most likely
targeted to gain control of the territory. However, IAE is endogenous to several factors apart from the
simple production of cocaine. As a result, I cannot yet ascertain if these attacks only respond to the
interests that irregular groups have on the territory for cocaine production or other factors, such as
the availability of petroleum or gold.
Finally, the drug war among dealers, captured by IDW , is also positively correlated with the
violence in Colombia, as Mej´ıa and Restrepo (2011) argue. According to my preliminary results, the
drug dealers’ war generates a total increase in the homicide rate between 0.61% and 2.77% and a
total increase in the displaced people rate between 2.69% and 7.53%. It is interesting to note that
the indirect effects of the drug dealers’ war is not as stable for the homicide rate than as for the
displacement rate. My preliminary results indicate that the drug dealers’ war affect more heavily
the homicide rate of the municipality where it takes place than the homicide rate of its surrounding
municipalities. In contrast, the drug dealers’ war not only affects directly the displacement rate of the
municipality in which it takes place, but also the displacement rate of those municipalities around it.
Consequently, according to my preliminary results, people seem to abandon their homes when drug
dealers attack each other in their municipalities of residence, or when they do it in the surrounding
municipalities. However, I cannot give these results a causal interpretation because IDW is endogenous
to the levels of violence, the production of narcotics and the government’s eradication activities.
To provide a causal interpretation, I perform a 2SLS analysis that is presented in the next section.
37The parameter associated to the drug enforcement military expenditures of equation (1).
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Before entering in that discussion, an important point is noted here: if IE , IAE and IDW really
capture the Colombian drug war military expenditures of all participants in the drug war during the
period 1999−2010, there were substantial first– and second–order effects of enforcement in Colombia.
The estimated first–order effect of enforcement derived from tables (A.3) and (A.4) is between 2.27%
and 3.00% for the homicide rate and between 2.12% and 3.83% for the displaced people rate. The
estimated second-order effect of enforcement is between 0.61% and 2.77% for the homicide rate and
between 2.69% and 7.53% for the displacement rate.
5.2 2SLS Results
The results of the first stage of the IV estimations are presented in table (A.5) in the appendix, which
is divided in two parts. The upper part of table (A.5) presents the estimation results for the number
of attacks initiated by the government against irregular groups and the number of attacks initiated
by irregular groups against the government’s security forces. Thus, it presents the results of equation
(12) in section (3.1). In turn, the lower part of table (A.5) presents the estimation results for the
logarithm of coca crops, the number of accidents and incidents with mine fields, and the number of
massacres perpetrated by irregular groups in their areas of influence. These are the results of equation
(13) in section (3.1).
The first column of each set of regression results in table (A.5) presents the estimated coefficients
provided by MATLAB. The other 3 columns present the direct, indirect, and total effects, which were
also computed as explained by Elhorst (2003) and Elhorst (2012). I also present the tests to determine
whether a Panel Data Spatial Durbin Model is the correct specification to estimate equations (12) and
(13), as explained by Elhorst (2012). The estimation results in table (A.5) do not control for any of
the panel data fixed or time effects. The latter is due to two reasons: first, fixed effects are perfectly
correlated with the altitude per municipality, one of the instruments in those estimations. Second,
time effects resulted statistically insignificant.
From table (A.5), several insightful results can be obtained. A first general result is that a Spatial
Durbin Model is the correct specification to estimate equations (12) and (13). The latter can be
concluded from the tests indicating that these estimations cannot be reduced to either a panel data
SAR or SEM models. This result might indicate that the government attacks irregular groups not only
because they are producing narcotics, but also because of their criminal activities, such as robberies,
kidnappings, and the like. The same can be said from irregular groups’ attacks. These groups have
an interest in the territory that goes beyond the sole production of narcotics.
Additionally, the number of attacks perpetrated by both groups is explained by the altitude in the
expected sign. If the altitude really captures the coca crops productivity, the number of attacks of both
groups is explained to some extent by the potential that municipalities have for cocaine production.
In regards to these attacks, I obtain two interesting results: on the one hand, the direct and indirect
spatial effects of the distance variables are statistically insignificant, but the total effects are weakly
significant for the number of attacks initiated by the government against irregular groups. It seems
that distances to capital cities and Bogota´ do not entirely capture the government’s military attacks
against irregular groups. However, the distance of municipalities to capital cities has some influence
on that decision: the farther municipalities were to Bogota´ and the closer they were to capital cities,
the more the government attacked irregular groups in these municipalities.
On the other hand, the distance variables are statistically significant for the irregular groups’
number of attacks; however, the results are mixed. The total effects of the distance variables indicate
that the number of attacks of irregular groups increased when the municipalities were farther from
Bogota´ and closer to their capital cities of departamento. These latter results are explained by the
estimated direct and indirect effects of the distance variables. The direct effects indicate that the
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number of attacks of irregular groups increased when the municipalities were both closer to Bogota´
and their capital of departamento. The indirect effects indicate that the municipalities’ neighbors
were less likely to be attacked when the municipalities were closer to Bogota´ and their capital cities
of departamento. This result might indicate that municipalities that were jointly close to capital
cities and Bogota´ had fewer attacks by these groups. This latter result is confirmed by the spatial
analysis laid out in section (3.2), where we observe that the number of irregular groups’ attacks have
a concentration at the bottom of the mountain chains that crosses Colombia from South to Northwest
and Northeast. However, in those municipalities that are really far away from the mountain chains or
at the top of them, near to Bogota´, the attacks were zero during the entire period under examination.
That is illustrated, for example, in the South of Colombia, in spite of being a region entirely dedicated
to the production of coca crops, as indicated in figure (A.3c).
Based on the empirical strategy explained in section (4) for equation (12), I use yˆ = βˆ0 + Xˆβˆ to
obtain exogenous proxies for the government and irregular groups’ drug war military expenditures on
the Colombian municipalities. As explained in section (4), I use the latter yˆ’s in the estimations of
equation (13) to obtain net exogenous measures of the Colombian drug dealers’ war. The regressions of
equation (13) are presented in the lower part of table (A.5), where govconthat and irreconthat represent
the proxies for the government and irregular groups’ drug war military expenditures obtained from
equation (12).
In regards to the results for the variables used to compute IDW , the total effects of the altitude
indicate that it negatively affects all three variables. That concurs with the results obtained by Mej´ıa
and Restrepo (2011), who also found out that cocaine production is negatively related to the altitude
per municipality in Colombia. This result also confirms my intuition that the number of incidents and
accidents with mine fields and massacres are also associated with the altitude in the expected sign. If
the altitude really captures a municipality’s cocaine productivity potential, my results indicate that
mine fields and massacres also seem to respond to the drug dealers’ war that Mej´ıa and Restrepo
(2011) attempt to control for only using coca crops as a proxy.
The results also confirm my intuition that the military actions of the government to eradicate
narcotics, captured by govconthat ’s total effects, have also an effect on the three variables. Additionally,
they show that these actions reduced the number of hectares of coca produced, reduced the number of
mine fields used by irregular groups, and increased the number of massacres in the country. All the
latter results can be interpreted as follows: first, coca crops showed a downward tendency during the
period of analysis38. This was clearly the response of the tougher drug enforcement policy initiated
with “Plan Colombia”.
Second, govconthat ’s total effects on the number of incidents and accidents with mine fields are
mostly influenced by govconthat ’s indirect effects. The govconthat ’s direct effect indicates that the
government’s direct actions to eradicate coca crops in the affected municipalities increased the in-
centives of irregular groups to use mine fields to protect the coca cultivated areas from eradication.
The govconthat ’s indirect effect indicates that once an area was totally controlled by the government,
this territorial control reduced the total amount of mine field cases. Finally, govconthat ’s total effects
on massacres are weakly statistically significant. This result is mainly influenced by the govconthat ’s
direct effects. Thus, it seems that coca eradication military attacks also increased the incentives for
irregular groups to commit massacres on the municipalities where eradication took place.
When I analyze the total effects of the anti-eradication activities, the results are less clear-cut
to understand. First, irreconthat ’s total effects indicate that the irregular groups’ anti-eradication
activities reduced the coca crops in Colombia. That result is influenced by irreconthat ’s indirect
38For a thorough analysis of coca crops in South America, see the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
website on crops monitoring in the world: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (2013).
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effects, which implies that when a municipality was more attacked, their neighbors produced fewer
coca crops. This might indicate that irregular groups made more attacks in those municipalities near
to coca production centers subjected to eradication. As irreconthat ’s direct effects are statistically
insignificant for coca production and coca production was reduced in the whole period, it seems that
the overall effect was that the irregular groups’ attacks did not attain what they intended to.
Second, irreconthat ’s total, direct, and indirect effects on the number incidents and accidents with
mine fields are all either statistically insignificant or weakly significant. This result might indicate that
anti-eradication military actions and mine fields are substitute inputs to protect the coca fields. Finally,
irreconthat ’s total effects on massacres are statistically significant. This result is mainly influenced
by irreconthat ’s indirect effects and can be interpreted as that of coca crops. It seems that irregular
groups’ anti-eradication attacks increased the number of massacres in the municipalities where they
attacked, which were in territories where they were losing influence.
In general, it appears that my empirical strategy gives sound proxies to be used in the second
stage of the IV strategy. I compute these proxies using yˆ = βˆ0 + Xˆβˆ and the estimated coefficients
from table (A.5). Table (A.1) in the appendix shows summary statistics for the re–computed indices
and figure (A.5) presents their maps. A quick comment is in order: it seems that the procedure to
recompute the indices do not bias in any systematic way their values. However, these new indices
have a slightly different distribution, being IE ’s distribution the most similar to the original one. Even
though, it does not appear that the new indices are re-computed in a way that favors my hypothesis.
The second IV stage is presented in tables (A.6) and (A.7) in the appendix, which replicates
equation (11) and tables (A.3) and (A.4) using the new indices obtained from equations (12) and (13)
to proxy for the drug war military expenditures. From tables (A.6) and (A.7), several results are also
obtained. First, the tests to ascertain the type of model to run again indicates that a Spatial Durbin
Model is the best specification for our data. There are omitted factors that help explain the violence
in Colombia different from the drug war variables, which are properly captured by Wv and WX terms
in equation (11).
Second, my results seem to indicate that the government’s drug enforcement activities do generate
violence in Colombia. Based on IˆE ’s total effects on the logarithm of the homicide and displacement
rates, the estimated impact of these actions is positive. According to tables (A.6) and (A.7), the
government’s eradication activities increased the homicide rate between 0.75% and 1.84% and the
displacement rate between 0.99% and 5.82%. All these estimates are statistically significant at common
significant levels.
Third, ˆIAE ’s estimated total effects indicate that anti-eradication activities by irregular groups
increased violence in Colombia. However, these estimated effects are not stable across specifications,
especially for the homicide rate. My results indicate that the sign and statistical significance of
the effect of the irregular groups’ anti-eradication activities varies when I include fixed effects in
the estimations. It seems that the activities that these groups perform on the territory they are
fighting for influence the way in which their actions affect the homicide rate. Fixed effects might
be capturing structural homicides that occur in the territory. There must be structural homicides
that are controlled and determined by these groups. My results indicate that when these structural
homicides are not controlled for, the irregular groups’ attacks have a statistically insignificant positive
direct effect on the municipalities in which they attack and a statistically significant negative indirect
effect on the surrounding municipalities where they attack. This result can be interpreted as implying
that once these groups have gained a sufficient important territorial control over a set of contingent
municipalities, their military actions against the government to control the territory with the intention
to produce cocaine reduce the homicide rate of the entire area, except where they are attacking. In
contrast, when I control for these structural homicides, their actions to control the territory only
affect positively the homicide rate on the territories where they attack. The latter is not true for the
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displacement rate where the effect of the irregular groups’ anti-eradication activities is always positive
across specifications.
Finally, ˆIDW ’s total effects indicate that the drug dealers’ war have mixed effects on violence in
Colombia, especially for the displacement rate. According to my results, this war generated a change
in the homicide rate between 2.29% and 4.37%. ˆIDW ’s direct and indirect effects are also rather stable
across specifications. They indicate that the drug dealers’ war increased the homicide rate in the
municipalities where this war took place and the surrounding municipalities as well. The latter is not
true for the displacement rate. In this case, the inclusion of fixed effects also affects the sign and
statistical significance of the drug dealers’ war effects on violence. It seems that there are structural
phenomena that are intertwined with the drug dealers’ war in the Colombian municipalities which
obscure the pure effect of the drug dealers’ war actual influence on the displacement rate. Once these
structural variables are controlled for with the fixed effects, the total, direct and indirect effects of the
drug dealers’ war on the displacement rate become statistically insignificant and with a contrary sign
to one expected.
In all the results presented in tables (A.6) and (A.7), the inclusion of fixed effects affected the
value of the estimated results. If I assume that the models containing these effects provide us with
the most accurate estimations, as the F tests at the bottom of tables (A.6) and (A.7) indicate, our
results show that drug enforcement has had important effects on violence in Colombia. Tables (A.6)
and (A.7) indicate that the government’s eradication military expenditure generated an increase of
1.84% in the homicide rate and 0.99% in the displacement rate. The drug dealers’ war generated
an increase of 4.00% in the homicide rate and 0.16% in the displacement rate. And, the irregular
groups’ anti-eradication activities generated an increase of 0.14% in the homicide rate and an increase
of 0.25% in the displacement rate. My results indicate that there were substantial first– and second–
order effects of enforcement in Colombia. The first–order effect is 0.98% for the homicide rate and
1.24% for the displacement rate. The second–order effect is 4.00% for the homicide rate and 0.16%
for the displacement rate.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that drug enforcement in a source country does generate violence, where the
latter is measured as rate of homicides or displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants. I use data on drugs
from Colombia during the period 1999–2010 to test this hypothesis. I find that drug enforcement has
two effects: first– and second–order effects. The first-order effect refers to the direct violence generated
by the drug war between the government and drug dealers. When the government spends on military
activities to control the production of narcotics, there are eventually victims that results from that
expenditure. Drug enforcement might also have an impact on the feeling of security of the inhabitants
of the areas where the drug war take place, forcing them to move to safer regions where they are not
affected by these activities.
However, this is not the only effect of enforcement. As narcotics are supplied by decentralized
markets, drug dealers have the monetary and the military power to fight back against the government’s
drug enforcement activities and against other drug gangs, with which a pacific resolution of conflicts
seems to be simply impossible. Our results also indicate that Colombian violence derives from factors
other than the country’s drug war. Colombian drug dealers also generate violence not associated
to cocaine production. This happens when drug dealers gain sufficient military power to control a
territory, which generates spillover effects over other activities on which violence is also used. This
is true, for instance, when irregular groups use the profits of narcotics to fight territorial control in
regions with other natural resources such as gold or petroleum. This also occurs when these groups
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use their military power to position themselves as the ultimate regulators of their regions of influence.
A meaningful conclusion reached in this paper is that in Colombia the use of mine fields is explained
by the production of cocaine and the drug enforcement activities of the central government. As a result,
one of the worst consequences of the Colombian conflict is actually incentivized by the Colombian drug
war. Another conclusion is that Colombian data show that there existed first– and second–order effects
of drug enforcement in the period 1999− 2010: my results indicate that the first–order effect is 0.98%
for the homicide rate and 1.24% for the displacement rate in the period 1999-2010 and the second–order
effect is 4.00% for the homicide rate and 0.16% for the displacement rate.
As a final conclusion, I cannot claim that the military tactics are the best methods to completely
control the existence of drugs in Colombia. Despite the strength gained by the Colombian army and
police from “Plan Colombia”, there are still Colombians interested in participating in the production
of cocaine. Given the existence of an international market providing these individuals with funds to
fight back the central government’s security forces, the result is that more Colombians are dying every
day for the war against drugs.
Appendix
A.0.1 The model
A.0.1.1 The problem
Let us use the following simple model which is based on Mej´ıa (2008)’s. Let us assume that there
are N municipalities in a country. This country is assumed to have a central government authority
that determines the set of rules that each of the N municipalities must follow39. There are Ng groups
who, have already decided to produce cocaine40 and are willing to engage in an anti-predatory game
(or anti-prohibition activities) against the government, if it decides to engage in a predatory game
(prohibition activities) against these groups. Each of the Ng are also willing to fight their share in
the drug market violently given the contractual environment in which they have to operate. The
government is assumed to have decided to prosecute the production of cocaine, and it’s willing to
engage in a predatory game to enforce such decision41
In this scenario, if group i decides to produce cocaine in municipality j, it has to spend M rj dollars
on military activities against the government and M iri,j dollars on military actions against the other
rival groups in order to seize territory in the following way:
Li,j = (1− ρgj )ρiri,jLj (A.1)
where Lj is the amount of territory in municipality j,
39Colombia is a presidential regime with a single legislature making policy decisions for the entire country.
40These Ng might be purely drug dealers, who produce drugs to simply gain a revenue, or irregular groups who decide to
seek a quick revenue in the production of drugs to supplement their other sources to accomplish their political objectives.
What matters in the sequel is that both drug dealers and irregular groups spend military resources to produce cocaine,
regardless of their objective at wanting to produce narcotics.
41For the sake of our argument, it does not matter whether the government reached this decision following the median
voter preference or the lobby of a single group within the country. What matters is the government’s willingness to use
the army to prosecute the production of cocaine, and the amount of money it is likely to invest in this activity. Hence,
we also assume that the economy has already solved the social problem of cocaine prohibition, and that there are people
who find profitable to join cocaine “firms”, even if it is illegal, and follow the rules they impose to solve their internal
social problem for coordinating the production of cocaine.
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ρgj =
Mgj
Mgj + φjM
r
j
(A.2)
is the proportion of land gained by the government when it spends Mgj dollars on military actions
in municipality j against all groups who are willing to spend resources on military actions on the same
municipality, and
ρiri,j =
M iri,j
M iri,j +
∑Ng
k 6=i=1M
ir
k,j
(A.3)
is the proportion of land gained by group i when it spends M iri,j dollars on military actions in munici-
pality j against all groups that are seeking to produce on the same municipality. Equations A.2 and
A.3 are called Contest Success Functions, which are functions widely used in the economic analysis of
conflict (see Skaperdas (1996)).
Equation A.2 assumes that
dMgj
dMrj
= φj
Mrj
Mgj
. As a result, a larger φj implies a larger military efficiency
of group i’s military expenditure on municipality j relative to the government’s. In contrast, equation
A.3 assumes that each group has the same military efficiency than the rest in all municipalities of the
country. This simplification is assumed because a priori each regular group can settle down in every
municipality, whereas the colombian government uses military bases to position its military forces to
attack. Not all municipalities have military bases. See Dube and Naidu (2012) for an analysis on the
way colombian government performs its military operations, the location of its military bases and the
possible consequences of these military operations on violence.
Using equations A.1–A.3, group i’s maximization problem is:
max
Ii,j ,MrjM
ir
i,j
pii(Ii,j ,M
r
j ,M
ir
i,j) =
Np∑
j=1
[PdθjI
α
i,jL
1−α
i,j − Ii,j −M rj −M iri,j ] (A.4)
where Ii,j is the amount of resources invested by group i in inputs for the production of cocaine
in municipality j, Pd is the international price of cocaine, and Np is the number of municipalities in
which all cocaine producers have decided to invest military resources to produce cocaine 42.
A.0.1.2 The solution
Equation A.4 can be solved in several ways. By its consistency characteristics, we will find the sub-
perfect nash equilibrium of this problem. For an analysis of the characteristics of a sub-perfect nash
equilibrium solution, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). To attain that, we will first determine the
optimal value of Ii,j and then determine the values of M
r
j to finally find the values of M
ir
i,j for every
group i and for every municipality j, in which cocaine producers decide to produce. Thus, we want
to determine the optimal amount of resources in inputs that every group is willing to invest in the
production of cocaine after having already (optimally) invested in war.
Taking first order conditions with respect to Ii,j in equation A.4, we get the following condition:
Ii,j = (Pdθjα)
1
1−αLi,j = (Pdθjα)
1
1−α (1− ρgj )ρiri,jLj (A.5)
42For simplicity, we assume that if a group i decides to invest military resources in municipality j, all (Ng-1) remaining
groups will also invest military resources in the same municipality. An alternative derivation would consider the case in
which a subset of the Ng invest in municipality j; however, for our purposes, it is innocuous to assume that all groups
behave similarly in terms of investing in the same municipality j or not.
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Inserting equation A.5 in equation A.4, we obtain the following expression:
pii(M
ir
i,j),M
r
j ,M
ir
i,j) =
Np∑
j=1
[(Pdθj)
1
1−ασLi,j −M rj −M iri,j ] (A.6)
where σ = (α
α
1−α −α 11−α ). Using equation A.6, we can determine the optimal value of M iri,j . Taking
first order conditions to equation A.6 with respect to M iri,j , we get the following expression:
M iri,j =
√√√√√(Pdθj) 11−ασ(1− ρgj )Lj Ng∑
k 6=i=1
M irk,j −
Ng∑
k 6=i=1
M irk,j (A.7)
Equation A.7 applies for every group i who decides to produce cocaine in municipality j. As a
result, equation A.7 can be solved for a symmetric value of M iri,j for which M
ir
k,j = M
ir
i,j = M
ir
j for all
groups k 6= i = 1, 2, · · · , Ng . Then, M iri,j becomes:
M irj =
(Ng − 1)(Pdθj)
1
1−ασ(1− ρgj )Lj
(Ng)2
(A.8)
Inserting equation A.8 in equations A.1 and A.6, we obtain the following expression for the optimal
revenue of group i:
pii(M
r
j ) =
Np∑
j=1
[
(Pdθj)
1
1−ασ(1− ρgj )Lj
N2g
−M rj ] (A.9)
Finally, from equation A.9 we can obtain the optimal value for M rj . Deriving this expression with
respect to M rj , we get:
M rj =
√
(Pdθj)
1
1−ασLjφjM
g
j
φjNg
− M
g
j
φj
(A.10)
I can use equation A.10 to obtain the following expression for M irj in terms of M
g
j :
M irj =
(Ng − 1)(Pdθj)
1
1−ασLj
(Ng)2
− (Ng − 1)
Ng
√√√√(Pdθj) 11−ασLjMgj
φj
(A.11)
A.0.1.3 Digression
If the most worrisome consequence in the war against drugs is violence generated by the government’s
and drug producers’ drug military expenditure, the model presented in section A.0.1 provides one
insightful result. If we had perfect information about military expenditures made by all parties on
municipality j to produce or avoid the production of narcotics and the violence rate in the same
municipality associated to the drug war, we could split municipality j’s violence rate in the following
way:
vj = β1M
g
j + β2M
r
j + β3M
ir
j + rest (A.12)
where β1M
g
j represents the violence rate explained by the government’s drug enforcement military
expenditure. β2M
r
j represents the violence rate explained by drug dealers’ anti-enforcement military
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expenditure. β1M
g
j + β2M
r
j is what we called the first-order effect of enforcement in the introduction.
Finally, β3M
ir
j represents the violence rate due to the drug dealers’ war when they fight over the
control of the territory to produce drugs. This is the second–order effect of enforcement.
A.0.2 Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Map of Colombia: Administrative Division
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(a) Rural Property Size Average
(b) 2005 GDP by Departamento
Figure A.2: Rationale behind using the distance variables
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(a) Logarithm of Homicide Rate (b) Logarithm of Displacement Rate
(c) Index of Cocaine Eradication (d) Anti-Eradication Index
Figure A.3: Endogenous Variables VS Eradication and Anti-Eradication Indices
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(a) Logarithm of Homicide Rate (b) Logarithm of Displacement Rate
(c) Dealers War Index
(d) Altitude
Figure A.4: Endogenous Variables VS Dealers War Index and Altitude
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(a) Instrumentalized IE (b) Instrumentalized IAE
(c) Instrumentalized IDW
Figure A.5: Instrumentalized Drug War Indices
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Position loghrate logdrate IE IAE IDW altitude
1 RISARALDA CAQUETA GUAVIARE ARAUCA GUAVIARE BOYACA´
2
VALLE DEL
CAUCA
GUAVIARE PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO CAQUETA NARIN˜O
3 ARAUCA ARAUCA CAQUETA CAQUETA ARAUCA C/MARCA*
4 CAQUETA PUTUMAYO ARAUCA CAUCA PUTUMAYO CALDAS
5 CALDAS META VICHADA META META QUINDI´O
6 GUAVIARE CESAR META GUAVIARE VAUPES RISARALDA
7 QUINDI´O CHOCO´ NARIN˜O RISARALDA VICHADA CAUCA
8 META BOLIVAR CAUCA
NORTE DE
SANTANDER
BOLIVAR SANTANDER
9 HUILA MAGDALENA
NORTE DE
SANTANDER
CASANARE
NORTE DE
SANTANDER
ANTIOQUIA
10 CASANARE ANTIOQUIA ANTIOQUIA HUILA CAUCA
NORTE DE
SANTANDER
11 ANTIOQUIA LA GUAJIRA BOLIVAR NARIN˜O ANTIOQUIA
VALLE DEL
CAUCA
12 PUTUMAYO CASANARE AMAZONAS
VALLE DEL
CAUCA
GUAINA HUILA
13 TOLIMA SUCRE CHOCO´ ANTIOQUIA NARIN˜O TOLIMA
14 CESAR CAUCA CESAR LA GUAJIRA AMAZONAS PUTUMAYO
15 LA GUAJIRA HUILA LA GUAJIRA TOLIMA CHOCO´ CASANARE
16
NORTE DE
SANTANDER
VICHADA CORDOBA CESAR LA GUAJIRA META
17 CAUCA
NORTE DE
SANTANDER
CALDAS QUINDI´O CESAR CAQUETA
18 NARIN˜O CORDOBA
VALLE DEL
CAUCA
CALDAS CORDOBA CESAR
19 C/MARCA* RISARALDA SANTANDER CHOCO´
VALLE DEL
CAUCA
GUAVIARE
20 CORDOBA CALDAS CASANARE SUCRE CALDAS ARAUCA
21 SUCRE
VALLE DEL
CAUCA
TOLIMA VAUPES SANTANDER VAUPES
22 ATLA´NTICO NARIN˜O MAGDALENA MAGDALENA CASANARE CHOCO´
23 SANTANDER TOLIMA GUAINI´A BOLIVAR MAGDALENA AMAZONAS
24 MAGDALENA QUINDI´O RISARALDA VICHADA HUILA LA GUAJIRA
25 VICHADA C/MARCA* BOYACA´ ATLA´NTICO TOLIMA VICHADA
26 BOLIVAR GUAINI´A HUILA C/MARCA* RISARALDA MAGDALENA
27 CHOCO´ ATLA´NTICO VAUPES SANTANDER SUCRE GUAINI´A
28 SAN ANDRE´S AMAZONAS C/MARCA* GUAINI´A C/MARCA* SUCRE
29 BOYACA´ SANTANDER QUINDI´O BOYACA´ QUINDI´O CORDOBA
30 AMAZONAS BOYACA´ SUCRE CORDOBA BOYACA´ BOLIVAR
31 VAUPES VAUPES ATLA´NTICO AMAZONAS SAN ANDRE´S ATLA´NTICO
32 GUAINI´A SAN ANDRE´S SAN ANDRE´S SAN ANDRE´S ATLA´NTICO SAN ANDRE´S
* CUNDINAMARCA
Table A.2: Ranking of Departamentos by Variable
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